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Reassessing Juvenile Justice in Japan: Net widening or
diversion?
Tom Ellis, Akira Kyo
This  article  provides  a  summary  of  the  first
comprehensive  overview  of  Japanese  youth
justice,  locating  it  within  wider  conceptual
considerations of youth justice before outlining
its historical development and questioning its
uniqueness. It discusses the contested notion of
pre-delinquency, its net widening potential, and
its place in the wider trends in Japanese youth
crime. The study critically assesses the overall
organization, administration, and impact of the
Family Court (equivalent to youth or juvenile
courts) and summarizes recent developments in
youth  crime policy.  The  Family  Court  is  the
fulcrum  of  youth  justice,  but  involves  many
social  welfare  elements.  Despite  the
increasingly  punitive  rhetoric,  policy,  and
legislation for juveniles in Japan, there is  no
evidence that more juvenile offenders are being
committed  to  the  adult  courts.  Overall,  we
found a clear precedence of social welfare over
criminal policy considerations.
Keywords: Japan; juvenile justice; youth justice;
welfare;  pre-delinquency;  police  guidance;
youth  crime;  sentencing;  penal  populism
Introduction
“Despite  a  plethora  of  discourses  on  youth
justice1  (http://apjjf.org/#_edn1)  among  legal
practitioners and academics in Japan, very few
attempts  have been made thus  far  at  giving
observers  in  other  jurisdictions  a  better
understanding of  Japan’s system” (Yoshinaka,
2010,  p.  27)  .  Taking  a  cross-national,
collaborative approach, this chapter therefore
draws  together  many  disparate  strands  of
information  in  order  to  provide  a  coherent
overview  of  Japanese  juvenile  justice.2
(http://apjjf.org/#_edn2)
We first locate Japanese juvenile justice within
general  conceptual  arguments  about  youth
justice,  before  outlining  its  historical
development with respect to Japanese juvenile
justice  and  the  arguments  concerning  its
uniqueness.  Next,  we  discuss  the  contested
area  of  pre-del inquency,  including  a
consideration of net widening, police and social
agencies’  relative  involvement  ,  and  the
outcomes for those given police guidance. We
then  prov ide  an  overv iew  of  the  key
characteristics of the decline in Japanese youth
crime.
These  conceptual  and contextual  themes  are
then  examined  empirically  through  outlining
and  cr i t iquing  the  organizat ion  and
administration  of  juvenile  justice  in  Japan,
focusing on the extent to which juveniles (those
aged 14–19) can be tried and sentenced in the
adult courts and the extent to which sentencing
rationales  and practices  in  the  Family  Court
have  been  af fected  by  recent  pol icy
developments. We end with an evaluation of the
main conceptual strands developed throughout
the article, including the balance of: welfare;
justice;  penal  populism;  and  policy  and
practice.
Locating  Japanese  Juvenile  Justice  within
Existing  Frameworks
Many  authors  have  argued  that  Japanese
criminal  justice  is  a  relatively  unique
phenomenon  (eg,  Schwertfeger  and  Zimring,
2013; Komiya, 1999; Bayley, 1991; Braithwaite,
1989;). However, others have argued that this
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uniqueness,  and,  in  particular,  the  role  of
Japanese culture, are overstated (Ellis, Lewis,
and  Sato,  2011;  Yoder,  2011;  Leonardsen,
2010;  Ellis,  Lewis,  Hamai,  and  Williamson,
2008;  Hamai  and  Ellis,  2008a)  Indeed,
Sugimoto  (2003,  p.  2),  argues  that  Japanese
citizens are only unusual in believing that their
nation  is  so  unique.  We  have  attempted  to
balance  these  two  polarized  methodological
and epistemological  approaches  to  provide  a
more  realistic  understanding  of  Japanese
juvenile  juctice.
Youth  jus t i ce  themes  deve loped  in
predominantly English-speaking literature are
also found very early on in Japanese juvenile
justice  discourse  and  policy,  e.g.:  the
continuum  from  welfare-based  processes  to
justice  solutions  and  the  shifting  emphases
over  time  in  response  to  events,  media
pressure,  political  imperatives,  etc..  In  this
context, Schwertfeger and Zimring (2013) note
that the Japanese juvenile justice system was
not a unique, autochthonous development, but
was based explicitly on the original American
model  from the  early  1900s.  Ironically,  they
argue  that  while  official  Japanese  juvenile
justice  policy  has  become  more  overtly
punitive, in practice it continues to focus on the
original  US  emphasis  on  rehabilitation  and
reintegration  even  as  the  United  States  has
developed  a  stronger  restorative  juvenile
justice policy discourse, yet remains punitive in
practice.
As in many other countries, the Japanese media
increasingly holds young people responsible for
the  choices  they  make  and  they  are  often
characterized as imprudent and irrational. The
media suggests that they should be blamed and
punished  accordingly,  whilst  ignoring
structural context and life experiences of young
offenders.  However,  Johnson  (2006,  p.  80)
argues that Japanese juveniles should in fact be
celebrated for their low level of offending (see
also Schwertfeger and Zimring,  2013; Hamai
and Ellis,  2008a, b;  Maeda, 2003).  We have,
therefore,  incorporated  the  use  of  empirical
evidence,  and  new  analyses,  to  support  our
critical approach.
Japanese Youth Justice in Context
In  Yoder’s  (2011  pp.  16–17)  wide-ranging
study, he argues that Japan is not “unique or
that  different  from other  modern democratic
capitalistic  societies”  in  channelling  juvenile
justice and wider social agencies towards the
control  and  punishment  of  disadvantaged
youth.  He  also  argues  against  the  uncritical
acceptance  of  wa  (harmony)  and  cultural
homogeneity in reducing the level  of  conflict
and  deviant  behavior  in  Japan.  Instead,  he
focuses on a history of repression of working-
class youth by the Japanese state and locates
the  introduction  of  the  modern  Japanese
juvenile justice system, from 1900, as part of
this  process  during  a  period  of  rapid
urbanization  and  growth  in  poverty-related
crimes (Yoder, 2011, p. 41).
As with Japanese policing (Ellis et al.,  2008),
what  appears  to  be  a  uniquely  Japanese
development of juvenile justice was actually a
conscious  importation  in  the  Meiji,  or
“enlightenment”  period (1868–1912),  of  what
was seen as the most promising system from
among  the  most  advanced  countries  in  that
period  (see  Dale,  1988).  Japan  therefore
adopted  and  adapted  the  world’s  first  and
(then) only juvenile justice system from the US.
The central social work component of parens
patriae was gradually incorporated (Hirose et
al. 2009, p. 16)
The legacy of this system is more apparent in
Japan than in the present-day US. In both the
US and Japan, juvenile justice was introduced
through state intervention to protect neglected
and  abandoned  youth.However,  there  was
always a tension (Vito, 2011, p. 19) between
managing children who had committed crimes,
but  also  those  who  were  merely  vulnerable,
within  a  justice  jurisdiction.  In  the  guise  of
“protecting  ‘at  risk’  children  and  preventing
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future criminal offenses” status offences were
created for a range of relatively trivial offences
applicable  only  to  juveniles  (eg:  truancy  or
running away from home).
While  Schwertfeger  and  Zimring  (2013,  pp.
17–18) argue that  rehabilitation was seen as
more central  than protection juvenile justice,
Yoder  (2011,  p.  41)  argues  that  protective
measures  that  placed  poor  youths  in
reformatories for pre-delinquent offences such
as  “living  in  improper  homes,”  vagrancy,
idleness,  or  even  “hanging  around  with  the
wrong  people”  were  the  precursors  to  the
present  day  netwidening  of  youth  offending
(e.g.,  running  away  from  home;  staying  out
overnight  without  parental  permission;  late
night loitering), along with the institutionalized
use  o f  po l i ce  surve i l l ance  fo r  bo th
apprehending  and  punishing  pre-delinquent
youth (Yoder, 2011, p. 42). It is worth noting
that parens patriae was successfully challenged
in 1967 in the USA but there was no parallel
process in Japan. In this sense, Japan’s juvenile
justice  system  still  reflects  the  original
protective  intentions  ,  with  reintegrative
adaptations, of the founders of the US juvenile
justice system.
The  differences  in  discourse  boil  down  to
whether  well-intentioned  delinquency
prevention  reform  produced  a  net-widening
social  control  effect  (Yoder),  or  whether  the
incorporation  of  social  agencies,  such  as
education and social work are seen as ways to
remove  some  personal  blame  from  juveniles
and  ensure  collective  responsibility  for
rehabilitation and reintegration (Schwertfeger
and Zimring, 2013)). These differences raise an
empirical question about where the line lies in
Japanese juvenile  justice,  but  before tackling
this, it is important to provide an overview of
the juvenile justice process.
The organsation of Japanese juvenile justice
The  current  structure  of  juvenile  justice  in
Japan was established by the Juvenile Act of
1948, which also underlined the primacy of the
Child  Welfare  Act  (1947).  Our  research
suggests  that  this  helps  maintain  a  more
explicitly  welfarist  model  than  that  of  most
other advanced democracies (eg, USA and UK).
Juveniles  in  most  countries  are  subject  to
additional,  age-related,  legal  controls.  The
question  is  whether  these  are  used  to
criminalize targeted young people, or to protect
and/or divert them from the justice system.
The key justice agencies potentially involved in
any juvenile justice event are: the police; the
Family (juvenile) Court; and the (adult) Public
Prosecutor’s  Office.  The  pre-court  processes
mainly  involve  the  police  and  often  involve
diversion from formal justice approaches at 3
levels in Japan: delinquency prevention through
community crime prevention organizations and
schools;  police  guidance  for  pre-delinquent
activities;  and  police  referral  to  the  family
court. Most studies of Japanese juvenile justice
focus only on the final level, but the first two
elements occur at the societal level and involve
far larger numbers.
Delinquency Prevention
Most  Japanese  neighborhoods  have  a
community  association  (chonai  kai)  that
includes a  bohan kai  (crime prevention unit)
who organize patrols that may detect underage
drinking,  smoking  ,  etc.  If  their  advice  is
ignored, they can report this to police. Police
can inform school-police coordinating councils
of pre-delinquency acts or crimes by pupils and
schools  can  inform police  of  pupil  incidents.
Teachers and police also conduct joint patrols
to “catch young people who are misbehaving”
(Yoder,  2011,  p.  22).  In  addition,  Yoder
(2011)lists many complementary organizations
that  have  some  level  of  involvement  in
managing juvenile delinquency, including: the
probation  service;  local  youth  development
assemblies;  the  Scouts;  and  Parent  Teacher
Associations.
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It seems that the delinquency net is cast very
wide, and Yoder presents this as evidence of
targeting working class youth. However, there
is no hard evidence of impact, no known figures
on the number of cases where advice is given,
or  the  proportion  referred  to  police.  The
question  that  is  perhaps  more  pertinent,
therefore, is what happens to those youths who
are referred to, or are stopped by police, in this
pervasive system?
Police Guidance
Juvenile pre-delinquency violations referred to
the police are recorded. Yoder therefore used
2008 statistics  and noted that  the 1,361,769
recorded youth pre-delinquency status offences
far  outnumbered  the  134,415  penal  code
offences by young people (Yoder, 2011, p. 37;
Hanzai  Hakusho,  2009;  Seishonen  Hakusho3
(http://apjjf.org/#_edn3),  2009)  and  that  pre-
delinquency rates more than doubled between
1972 and 1983. The implication here is that all
1,361,769 pre-delinquency cases would result
in  a  juvenile  police  record.  If  taken  at  face
value, this does seem to represent a high level
of justice net–widening for young people.
However,  this  picture  needs  some  careful
deconstruction.  First,  the  number  of  pre-
delinquency  cases  is  volatile  over  time  and
clear  trends  are  hard  to  discern.  Figure  1
shows the number of pre-delinquency offences
vary  considerably  over  a  longer  period  than
Yoder used, and that 2008 represented a high
point. By 2014 the numbers had almost halved
to  731,174,  indicating  that  there  was  no
inexorable rise in pre-delinquency offences by
young  people  or  police  pursuit  of  them.
Importantly,  recorded pre-delinquency  should
not result in a police or criminal record (Nawa,
2006).
Figure 1: Number of juveniles issued with
police guidance for pre-delinquency status
offences, 1975-2014
Second, police officers use their discretion to
divide  the  offending youths  into  less  serious
furyo  koi  shonen  (unwholesome/misbehaving
juveniles)  and  more  serios  guhan  shonen
(crime-prone juveniles). As Figure 2 shows, no
further action was taken beyond police advice
in  2013  in  809,652  (most  furyo  koi  shonen
cases) pre-delinquency cases. The more serious
guhan shonen cases are referred directly to the
Family Court, but their number is tiny, just 343
in 2013. This perhaps puts some perspective on
the extent to which pre-delinquency represents
net widening into the justice system or multi-
agency diversion away from it.  Indeed,  even
this  overrepresents  the  extent  of  the  use  of
justice-only  solutions,  as  the  next  section
shows.
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Figure 2: process and outcomes for pre-
delinquency cases through the Family
Court, 2013
1
 (http://apjjf.org/#_ftn1)
Pre-delinquency in the Family Court
Figure 2 also outlines the outcomes of the 343
guhan shonen pre-delinquency cases dealt with
by the Family Court in 2013, showing that 25%
of them did not require a hearing or a justice
disposal.
Overall,  while  the  police  are  very  active  in
focusing on young people, and this is likely to
be disproportionately the case in poorer areas
as  in  most  countries,  the  evidence  suggests
that  net-widening  into  the  justice  system
appears overstated in previous research. It is
now important to look at trends in the much
smaller  number  of  recorded  juvenile  crimes,
how  these  are  processed,  and  the  disposals
made.
Real Crime? Recorded Juvenile Offences
Overall,  recorded  youth  crime  in  Japan  has
plummeted!
As Figure 3 shows, cleared offences in Japan
decreased 9% overall from 330,126 in 2000, to
301,331 in 2012. This reduction was entirely
due to the 48% drop in juvenile offending and
was offset somewhat by the 25% increase (to
221,901) in adult offences (Ministry of Justice,
2014a).
Of  course,  the youth offending rate  (6.7  per
1,000 in 2012) is much higher than the adult
rate (2.1 per 1,000 in 2012), but it has fallen
sharply  while  the  adult  rate  has  remained
relatively flat, peaking at 2.6 per 1,000 in 2006.
The current  rate of  juvenile  offending is  the
lowest recorded since 1966.
It is worth noting that the number of homicides
by juveniles in Japan has also plummeted and is
historically low, with only around 5 percent of
all  homicides now committed by those under
20,  with  older  age  groups  now  increasingly
responsible (Ellis and Hamai, 2017). There is
also no evidence of potential displacement of
homicides, either behaviorally or as a recording
artefact,  into  other  serious  offending  (i.e.,
robberies resulting in death) (Ellis and Hamai,
2017).  We  therefore  agree  with  Johnson’s
(2006, p. 80) argument that this challenges the
seemingly  positivistic  universal  notion  that
crime  declines  with  age  (Gottfredson  and
Hirschi, 1990, p. 124). Ellis and Hamai’s (2017)
emprirical analysis also documents this trend in
other  advanced  South  East  Asian  countries,
casting further doubt on Japanese uniqueness.
Figure 3: Number of juveniles cleared for
penal code offences (non-traffic)
2000-2012
2
 (http://apjjf.org/#_ftn2)
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The Administration of Juvenile Justice in Japan:
A Complex Set of Processes
As Figure 4 shows, the structure and processes
of  Japanese juveniles  justice is  complex,  and
revolves around the Family Court. As in many
juvenile  justice  jurisdictions,  Family  Court
hearings are closed to the public. They typically
involve a single Family Court judge, although
three  judges  can  be  involved  in  more
demanding cases (Hirose et al., 2009, p. 74).
J u v e n i l e s  t h em s e l v e s ,  o r  t h e i r
parents/guardians,  can  assign  an  attendant,
most often a lawyer, at the hearing. Victims in
serious cases can apply to attend, but judges
use discretion over whether this would disrupt
the youth’s healthy development, indicating a
positive bias toward the primacy of  welfarist
considerations (Art. 22-4, Juvenile Act, 1948).
Most  criminal  cases  (as  opposed  to  pre-
delinquency and/or kanisochi summary cases)
must initially be referred to the (adult) Public
Prosecutor’s Office, which is the most powerful
agency in the justice process (see Hamai and
Ellis, 2006, 2008a, 2008b), but they are mostly
referred on to the Family Court to process.
Figure 4: The basic organisation of
Japanese juvenile justice (2013 figures3
(http://apjjf.org/#_ftn3))
Crucially,  Family Courts are located within a
broader  social  framework  where  a  justice
approach is  not always the desired outcome.
Under Article 3 of the Juvenile Act of 1948, 3
categories of  juveniles  are dealt  with by the
Family  Court,  only  one  of  which  would
technically  qualify  as  offenders  in  the  adult
penal  code,  echoing  Yoder’s  concern  around
net-widening and social control. The first two
categories  are  simply  classified  according  to
whether offending juveniles are under 14 years
of age, or are 14 to under 20 years of age. The
third cateogory are the pre-delinquents covered
above  (under  the  Juvenile  Act  of  1948,
paragraph 1, Article 3). Although The Japanese
adult  and  youth  justice  system  effectively
def ines  the  current  age  o f  cr imina l
responsibility  (sekinin)  as  14  years  of  age
(Article 41 of the Criminal Law of 1907) (Kai,
2010,  p.  4),  and  adult  court  jurisdiction
normally  starts  at  20,  the  inclusion of  those
under 14 muddies tha waters.
Offending juveniles under 14 years of age
If  there is  evidence of  an offence,  police (or
guardians) refer juvenile offenders under 14 to
the director of their local child guidance center
(essentially under a social welfare remit). The
director of a center, or prefectural governor,
must  then  use  their  discretion  to  decide
whether to refer the case to the Family Court.
In practice, this requires balancing welfare and
justice  considerations.  Empirically,  the  Child
Welfare Act4  (http://apjjf.org/#_edn4) prevails,
despite the 2007 revisions for serious cases. As
Figure 4 shows, there were over 12,000 police
referrals to social welfare agencies in 2013, but
only around 400 (3%) of these were referred on
to  the  Family  Court.  Even  then,  a  justice
outcome is still not a certainty. A Family Court
r e s e a r c h  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f f i c e r 5
(http://apjjf.org/#_edn5)  investigates  and  a
decision is then made on whether to proceed
with a formal Family Court hearing (as opposed
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to a trial in the adult court) or to refer back to a
prefectural governor. In 2013, 161 (39%) of the
referrals  from  social  welfare  agencies  were
referred back to them (see Ministry of Justice,
2014b).
Thus,  despite  the  possibility  of  labelling
children under 14 as offenders, the empirical
evidence confirms the precedence of the Child
Welfare  Act  over  the  Juvenile  Act  ensures  a
broader  governmental  approach.  The  2012
White  Paper  on  Children  and  Young People,
under  the  Promotion  of  Development  and
Support  for  Children  and  Young  People  Act
(2009)  balances  consideration  of  ‘safety  and
problematic behavior’ as the third key element
in a more holistic approach to social policy for
young people which also includes the ‘rearing
environment’ and ‘social life’. This can be seen
as the continuing influence of parens patrie, as
discussed earlier, and is very much within an
overarching societal support system.
Juvenile offenders aged 14 to 19
For  juveniles  over  14  where  the  maximum
sanction for the offence is a fine, the police can
refer  them directly  to  the Family  Court,  but
most cases (105,000 in 2013 – see Figure 4)
have to be referred initially to the (adult justice
system)  Public  Prosecutors  Office.  However,
almost  all  of  them are  referred  back  to  the
Family Court (Article 42 of Juvenile Act 1948).
The Family Court must then assess all  cases
involving  a  serious  offence  committed  by  a
juvenile  aged  16  or  older,  including  those
punishable by custody or the death penalty. If a
criminal sanction is deemed appropriate by the
Family Court, the case must be referred back
again to the Public Prosecutor, and discretion
not to do so was restricted in the revision of
Juvenile Act in 2000.
The complexity deepens with the inclusion of
kanisochi  or  formal  summary  juvenile  cases6
(http://apjjf.org/#_edn6)  (usually  directly
referred  by  the  police  to  the  Family  Court,
22,565  in  2013).  From  Yoder’s  perspective,
these  cases  appear  to  have  the  further
potential for net-widening in a similar, though
more  formal,  way  than  the  pre-delinquency
cases  discussed  earlier.  However,  from  a
Japanese perspective  (Hirose et  al.,  2009,  p.
419; Hirose, 2013, p. 53; Kawaide, 2015) they
might also be considered a diversion.
We  found  that  in  the  vast  majority  (98%,
22,128) of  kanisochi  cases,  the Family Court
decided that no hearing was necessary and the
original police guidance was sufficient. In fact,
only 165 (0.7% )  of  kanisochi  cases referred
directly by the police proceeded to a Family
Court  hearing  and  a  justice-based  disposal.
Most of these (112; 68%) were given probation
while 40 (24%) were sent to the adult court,
where they would receive a maximum sentence
of a fine (see Figure 4). It would seem, then,
that while some juveniles are caught in this net,
the mesh is extremely wide.
Juveniles Dealt with in the Adult Court
Figure 4 shows that 4,916 juveniles (4% of all
121,284 juveniles referred to the Family Court)
were  returned  by  the  Family  Court  to  the
Public  Prosecutor  in  2013.  Of  these,  1,845
(37.5% ) had reached adult age (over 19) and
would be classified as adults in the sentencing
system, leaving 3,071 (62% ) cases that were
still classed as juveniles but were assessed by
the (adult) public prosecutors. Of these, 2,590
were sent for trial and sentencing in the adult
courts. Most of these (2,314, 89 percent ) were
tried in the lowest tier (Summary) adult court
and received a fine. Overall, then it is possible
for juveniles to be tried and sentenced in the
adult system, but only after a complex welfare-
based assessment by the Family Court and the
vast  majority  of  juvenile  offenders  are  dealt
with  by  the  Family  Court  (Hirose,  2009;
Kawaide, 2015).
Importantly,  while  youth  justice  disposals
halved  from 231,973  in  2004  to  104,892  in
2013,  the  proportion  referred  to  the  Public
Prosecutors has remained remarkably stable at
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4-5% (see Ministry of Justice, White Paper on
Crime,  2005–2014).  This  indicates  that  there
has  been no  hardening  of  sentencing  in  the
Family  Court  over  this  period.  Further,  no
juveniles  under  16  have  entered  the  prison
system since 2000. Most juveniles imprisoned
through adult courts have been in the 18 or 19
age group.7 (http://apjjf.org/#_edn7)
Certainly,  there are no grounds for the view
that  there  has  been  increasing  punitivity  in
sentencing the decreasing numbers of juvenile
offenders in Japan’s adult courts. However, this
trend  might  be  affected  by  the  June  2015
changes imposed from outside youth justice by
the  revised Public  Offices  Election  Law,  i.e.,
lowering the voting age to 18 from 20, with
supplementary  provisions  to  also  lower  the
upper age for juvenile justice in the future from
19  to  18  (Japan  Times,  2015).  This  was
vigorously  opposed  by  the  Japan  Bar
Association,  some politicians,  academics,  and
Family  Court  practitioners.  Certainly,  Japan
may lose its hitherto relatively unique inclusion
of  young adults  within  the  scope of  juvenile
justice, just as Europe, and especially Germany,
is  moving  in  the  opposite  direction  (Dünkel,
2015).  This  would  go  against  international
trends  and,  indeed,  against  new evidence  in
neurosciences about the maturation processes
of young people (Dünkel and Pruin, 2012). But
what  of  the  majority  of  juvenile  referrals
processed in the Family Court?
Outcomes in the Family Court
Echoing back to the original US origins of the
concept, the first consideration of the Family
Court is whether it is necessary to place the
juvenile under protective measures.  Figure 5
shows that, in 2014, 52% referred cases were
dismissed  without  a  hearing  and  no  further
criminal  justice  action  was  taken.  At  the
investigation  stage,  distinctly  non-justice
options  are  considered.  Under  protective
detention,  juveniles  are  assessed  through
“interviews,  psychological  tests,  behavioural
observations, and medical diagnosis, as well as
other external information” (Ministry of Justice,
2012). These assessments are used to decide
whether a Family Court hearing is appropriate,
and  if  so,  whether  non-justice  options  are
appropriate.
Of the remaining 50,561 cases that proceeded
to  a  hearing  (whether  through  protective
detention or not),  21,349 (42 percent )  were
deemed to require no further action,  leaving
29,051cases to receive Family Court protective
measures (see Figure 5).
Less  than  1% of  Family  court  disposals  are
mandated social  welfare based provisions for
juveniles younger than 18 and are managed by
qualified social workers through the Ministry of
Health,  Labor,  and  Welfare.  This  disposal,
which is limited to and accounts for less than 1
percent of hearing disposals, is most likely to
be ordered for those at risk of delinquency or
involved  in  delinquency  due  to  family
circumstances.
Probation, is an ostensibly more recognizable
justice disposal and accounts for 41% of Family
court  hearing  disposals.  However,  some
authors  (e.g.,  Kai,  2010;  Lewis  et  al.,  2009)
regard probation as diversion from a criminal
justice sanction. It is carried out by volunteer
probation  officers,  often  supervising  juvenile
offenders from their own homes (Lewis et al.,
2009). Indeed, there is no equivalent probation
disposal  in  adult  justice,  where  probation
supervision  is  limited  to  parole  and  a  small
number of suspended prison sentences (Lewis
et al., 2009).
This leaves only a very small proportion (6%) of
Family Court hearings that technically result in
a  criminal  sanction,  mostly  through  Juvenile
Training  Schools  (JTS),  which  are  run
independently  of  the  adult  prison system.  In
short,  there  is  relat ively  l ight  use  of
incarceration for  juvenile  offenders  in  Japan.
The relative distribution of  the disposals  has
also changed very little over time (see Ministry
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of Justice, White Paper on Crime, 2005–2014).
In a comparative context then, Japan, perhaps
not  surprisingly,  has  a  complex  set  of
jurisdictions  over  juveniles  and outcomes for
young people. This draws to some extent on the
wider arena of prevention of delinquency, but
also  on  social  services  and other  non-justice
agencies,  thus  often  making  youth  justice
difficult  to  locate  along  the  welfare/justice
continuum in a comparative sense. On the one
hand,  the  tendency  toward  a  welfare  model
that  involves  non-criminal  justice  agencies
means that there is a level of net-widening that
draws in pre-delinquents who technically would
not be offenders in many jurisdictions. On the
other  hand,  there  are  those  who  technically
would be dealt with as offenders within a youth
justice process in most countries, but who are
instead diverted under child welfare provisions.
Recent Major Policy Developments
When considering recent policy developments
in Japanese juvenile justice, it is important to
recognize  the  role  of  public  opinion,  and
especially  the  victims’  lobby,  on  increased
punitivism.  Hamai  and  Ellis  (2008a)  have
argued that penal populism (genbatsuka) has
affected both adult and youth justice in Japan in
ways that might seem very familiar to those in
the  United  States,  England  and  Wales,  New
Zealand,  and  many  other  countries.  Indeed,
Honjo  (2014)  has  highlighted  the  increasing
public  willingness  to  sentence  juvenile
offenders with harsher punishments, including
the death penalty. Successive revisions to the
Juvenile Law have become punitive for young
offenders at the same time as their offending
has plummeted. While these changes have been
opposed  by  many  Japanese  academics  (eg,
Saeki, 2008; Maruyama, 2008; Konishi, 2010 a,
b; Konishi, 2011), our analysis shows no effect
on the proportion of juveniles transferred to the
adult  courts  for  trial  and  sentencing.  It  is
important  to  note  that  the  2000,  2007,  and
2014 revisions also strengthened due process
by improving access for juveniles’  lawyers to
Family Court hearings.
Conclusions
Overall, our findings suggest that, empricially,
Japanese  juvenile  justice  gives  clear
precedence  of  social  welfare  over  criminal
policy  considerations.  Whilst  there  is
increasingly  punitive  rhetoric,  policy  and
legislation for juveniles in Japan, it is not based
on any empirical evidence of increased criminal
activity, indeed, the record shows a dramatic
reduction in youth crime. More encouragingly,
Family  Court  sentencers  have  not  changed
their  generally  rehabilitative  behaviour  and
there  is  no  evidence  that  more  juvenile
offenders are being committed to adult courts,
despite  the  continuous  lowering  of  age
restrictions for serious offences since 2000. All
but the most serious cases continue to be heard
and disposed of by the Family Court, most often
with  a  non-justice,  or  diversionary,  outcome.
However, whether this results in net widening,
labelling and applying middle class values to
working  class  kids,  or  in  ensuring  collective
responsibility  for  juveniles  and  preventing
exclusion,  will  continue  to  be  debated.  Our
analysis  suggests  that  the  Japanese  juvenile
justice,  unlike  Japanese  adult  justice,  favors
welfare over justice outcomes.
This article is based on an open access chapter
by the same authors:
E l l i s ,  T .
(https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/portal/en/per
s on s / t om - e l l i s ( 5 3835161 - 4443 - 48d4 -
b44c-85ebb5550e1e).html)  &  Kyo,  A.
(2017).Youth  Justice  in  Japan.  In  M.  Tonry
(Ed.),Oxford  handbook of  crime and criminal
justice  online  Oxford  University  Press.
DOI:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935383.013.65
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/978019993
5383.013.65)
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Notes
1 Sources: National Police Agency, White Paper on Police, 2014
(https://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/h26/honbun/index.html) [available in Japanese only] Ministry
of Justice, White Paper on Crime, 2014 (http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/61/nfm/gmokuji.html)
[available in Japanese only].
2 See Ministry of Justice (2013) White paper on crime Part3/Chapter1/Section1/1
(http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/en/62/nfm/n_62_2_3_1_1_1.html)
3 White Paper on Youth.
4 See here
(http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=11&vm=04&re=01&new=1)
5 Often referred to as “Family Court research law clerk” in official Japanese documents in
English.
6 At this point, it is very important to be aware that Japanese criminal justice statistics in the
annual White Papers are compiled in an esoteric way, which can easily lead to
miscalculations. This is generally because the published column totals are often higher than
the sum of the individual subtotals in those columns. The reason for this is difficult to find, but
is due to the kanisochi figures. One place this is clarified is in Appendix 3-10 “Number of
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juveniles conclusively disposed in family courts for juvenile protection cases by type of
delinquency and type of disposition (2013)
(http://hakusyo1.moj.go.jp/jp/61/nfm/gmokuji.html)” of the White Paper on Crime (2014).
[available only in Japanese]. Here, it states that the differences between such totals are due to
the exclusion of cases from the subtotals that involve juveniles for penal code offenses,
special act offenses, and pre-delinquency offences referred directly to family courts by police.
However, they are included in the final totals of the tables. The upshot of this arcane
procedure is that once aware of it, it allows the reader to calculate just how many of these
cases there are, which is how we derived our figure of 22,565. To complicate matters further,
another set of figures is commonly referenced from judicial statistics
(http://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/toukei/193/007193.pdf) [available only in Japanese], which
have a slightly different total of 22,649 (i.e., 84 more). We have used only the White Paper
(2014) figures throughout to maintain consistency.
7 See Note 2 of Table 3-15 referred to earlier.
